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Introduction 
The concept of organic law has been spread more than 50 countries around the world, and it has 
been denominated by various terminologies such as qualified or institutional laws, however in 
the interest of uniformity this paper shall use the term organic law. This paper explores the scope 
of organic law and its role in the development of constitutionalism in Africa, especially in the 
field of constitutional adjudication, and the structure of the judiciary. Nevertheless, the relevant 
European models will be also kept in mind as contextual elements, and as crucial point of 
references for the African development. The main goal of this contribution is two-folded. On the 
one hand, the academic literature has not been analysed in depth the characteristics and potential 
classification of African organic laws, therefore, as for starters, we attempt to provide a general 
framework of this issue, with a mostly descriptive character. For this reason, relatively long 
chapters will cover the background and the context of African organic laws. Although their 
essentially summarizing character, these parts are indispensable, as the basic framework of 
African organic laws have not been outlined earlier by relevant academic contributions. Some of 
the issues to be addressed include the historical overview of organic laws, its spread into Africa 
especially its effect on the stability of key institutions and the protection of fundamental rights 
and freedoms on the continent. It shall be also investigated, whether the African model of 
organic law offers any new insights or is it a mere adoption of the European models. Moreover, a 
comparative analysis between varieties of African organic laws and the European models is 
targeted. On the other hand, as specific issues within this relatively broad field, three questions 
will be raised: how organic laws could influence the efficiency of constitutional adjudication; 
whether organic law would have any impact to the status of the judicial branch, and whether 
further instruments would be advisable to develop the current system further. The methodology 
to be used means comparative analysis of constitutions of various states in Africa and in certain 
regards Europe, and the assessment of secondary literature, mostly published in Europe and 
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North-America. In the reality, most organic laws of the world are adopted in Africa, as more than 
twenty African constitutions have implemented the framework of organic law, usually with any 
heightened majority requirement, and with a broader set of judicial review. 
Organic law is defined as a category of statutes havingconstitutional backing that cover at least 
theoretically, the most important legislative subject matters, usually the protection of institutional 
frameworks and fundamental rights and freedoms.
1
Organic laws operate using stricter procedural 
mechanisms than those available under ordinary legislative processes (usually passed by super 
majority).
2
 Organic laws are also underpinned by constitutional, political and historical 
functions.
3
 Due to their origin, organic laws are more common in civil law countries in Europe, 
such as France,
4
 and Spain.
5
 In Spain for example organic laws form part of the Constitutional 
bloc, which includes those norms, which might be invoked during the constitutional review of 
ordinary laws.
6
 
1. Background 
This section covers the origin and samples of African organic lawsto facilitate a better 
understanding of the concept, as this field has been considered traditionally as little-researched. 
Therefore, We would provide a historical, political and legal overview of organic laws and its 
major classifications and models around the world, which have been highly influentious also in 
the African continent. 
1.1. Models of Organic Laws 
By general terms, there are three main models of organic laws namely: the French, the Spanish 
and the Hungarian approach. Especially the first two samples produced remarkable impact in 
Africa, mostly owing to the post-colonial influence of these countries. As it will be demonstrated 
later, organic laws have been implemented across Africa from Tunisia to Angola, so one may 
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argue, that there could be also a fourth African model. On the contrary, this paper argues, that the 
despite the fact, that African organic laws show certain common characteristics, the African 
model has not yet crystallized into a model as it is still in flax and ever changing. Each of these 
models espouses unique constitutional, legal and historical context that make it apart from the 
other. 
1.1.1. The French Model 
Organic laws first came into existence through the effforts of De Gaule, who was the founding 
President of the Fifth French Republic).
7
 He viewed the role of organic laws as being the 
protector of institutions but not necessarily of fundamental rights and freedoms.
8
 Organic laws 
were forthwith encapsulated into the French Constitution in 1958 with the aim of weakening the 
power of parliament to reorganize institutions and rebalance the separation of powers.
9
 
De Gaule had three main reasons to make his decision to undermine parliamentary powers. 
Firstly, the Fourth Republic was formed after the second World War was not only weak but 
unstable with frequent changes in government.
10
 According to him, limiting parliamentary power 
and giving more of it to the executive was the panacea for stability in France. Secondly, the 
frequent political and legal changes caused instability and without any safeguards on stability 
norms arising from parliamentary majority, organic laws were viewed as a check on existing 
unlimited powers of Parliament,
11
 that held state captive to political considerations.
12
 Thirdly, 
and more importantly, organic laws were motivated by the sheer fear of dictatorship and a desire 
not to return to authoritarian rule experienced during the second World War arising from Nazi 
occupation.
13
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The French model provided inspiration for other European models and later also the 
decolonization of Francophone Africa.
14
 On attainment of independence, more, than 20 African 
countries have adopted this model,
15
 that is why it is unavoidable to analyse here the origin of the 
French framework. From France, organic laws spread not only to Africa, but also to other 
Central European states of Spain, Hungary, Moldova and Portugal and to Latin America. Several 
elements of the French system will also appear during the assessment of the African 
development. 
1.1.2. The Spanish Model 
The Spanish model traces its origin to the fall of the authoritarian regimes in Spain and 
Portugal.
16
This model is much more recent as it was introduced in the Constitution in 1978 as 
part of the democratic transition after the fall of Franco’s regime. Although the Spanish model 
was influenced by the French one, it clearly lacked democratic credentials. The republican 
tradition of Spain was usually shortlived due to instability since institutions lacked capacity to 
grow into bulwark against authoritarian rule.
17
 
The application of organic laws in the Spanish model was designed to balance its role between 
strengthening institutional frameworks and the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. 
Spanish courts have provided a narrower interpretation of the organic laws so as not to limit 
government actions unnecessarily.
18
 This contrasts sharply with Portugal whose institutional 
approach is closer to that of the French.
19
Organic laws in Spain were therefore considered as 
mechanisms to address the fragmented political climate caused by too many political parties and 
the ethnicization of politics.
20
Thus a wider consent was required as being essential for the long-
term provision of a new legislative framework, new governance structures and integrity that 
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would stabilize the state.
21
 Evidently, the scope of organic laws in Spain is broader due to the 
desire to protect democracy, fear of totalitarianism, requirements of integrity and ethnic 
inclusion.
22
 The Spanish model inspired the implementation of organic laws in the Constitution 
of several Latin-American countries,
23
 and also the Portuguese model, which was considered by 
Angola, and the Cape Werde Islands during the 1970s.
24
 
1.1.3. The Hungarian Model 
The Hungarian model originated from the era of historical development where Cardinal laws 
formed the basis of the Hungarian constitutional regime.
25
 However, the historical Cardinal laws 
have not beeen elaborated precisely, their exact circle was always dubious.
26
 Moreover, these 
laws were subject to the same legislative processes just like ordinary laws.
27
 In 1989, modern 
organic laws were introduced in Hungary, initially, this new category of organic law amounted to 
quasi constitutional force, but this was abolished in 1990.
28
 Any adoption or amendment of these 
new laws required a two thirds majority in Parliament.
29
 This form of qualified law was designed 
to institute certainty in the legislation, and their denomination is cardinal law since 2012, when 
the new Fundamental Law of Hungary came into effect. Fundamental rights and freedoms were 
left out from the updated enumeration of cardinal laws, which brings the Hungarian model closer 
to the French one where institutional protection is the dominant factor.
30
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The Hungarian model is characterised by a two thirds majoritarian rule for the enactment of 
organic law. This approach demonstrates the political character of the model since a wider 
consent would be required rather than a mere simple majority, which would provide certain 
political weight to the opposition. The term of „cardinal law” was just symbolic as it cemented 
the historical foundation of the fundamental law in Hungary.
31
In Central-Europe, a mixed model 
of qualified law, inspired by the French, the Spanish, and Hungarian development also was 
adopted by Romania
32
 and Moldova
33
 mainly after the democratization process. Other states of 
the former Soviet Union also adopted this model momentarily but the relevant constitutional 
provisions have been repealed. 
2. Context of Organic Laws in Africa 
2.1.  General overview 
After having considered European samples, as an indirect, but crucial background, now we turn 
to the direct assessment of the relevant African solutions. As for starters, one shall outline an 
overarching picture from the current tendencies as regard African organic laws, more precise 
conclusions shall be based on this ground. Organic laws in Africa were mainly inspired by the 
decolonization process which explains why this concept is common in Francophone rather than 
Anglophone countries. The European experience shall have been outlined as part of the context, 
since African organic laws were entailed primarily by their European counterparts. Nevertheless, 
if one tries to describe the basic character of african organic laws, it shall be highlighted, that 
they are usually not mere adoptations of European versions, the implemented models were 
always adapted to suit local circumstances. The particular background is crucial, as most of the 
newly formed independent African states were not cohesive as they were mere ethnic enclaves 
created by colonial governments and forced to co-exist. The Maghreb region shall be 
distinguished clearly here from other parts of Africa, as an exception, since those states 
constituted more or less an unitary development for the ancient period. However, most African 
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states expected to be threatened by the internal conflicts, therefore, all instruments were 
considered, which could promote the stability of these countries. In most Francophone countries, 
organic laws were adopted as a mechanism to promote internal stability, strengthen national 
cohesion and avoid authoritarian tendencies.
34
 
An important characteristic of organic laws in Africa is that they are partly diverse variants of 
European legal frameworks mainly France, Spain and Portugal. A cursory glance at the five 
groups of African states where organic laws have been adopted reveals that they are regions that 
were formerly colonized by the French or Portuguese empires and followed the French and in 
certain respects Portuguese constitutional model. Firstly, some North-African countries from the 
Maghreb have introduced organic laws, which survived even the Arab Spring.
35
 Secondly, those 
West African states shall be mentioned, which were colonized by the French,
36
 with the 
exception of Mali, where this legal instrument has not been applied. Thirdly, there are 
Francophone countries in East Africa;
37
 fourthly, certain Central African countries that were 
mainly influenced by both France and Belgium.
38
 Fifthly, and more importantly after the fall of 
Salazar government in Portugal, organic laws were implemented not only in Portugal, but also in 
Angola and Cape Verde.
39
 There are remarkable differences between each region, and even 
amongst the particular subgroups. The applied level of majority; the existence or lack of a priory 
judicial review; the detailed rules on the qualified legislative process; and the prescribed scope of 
organic law are such key factors, which make considerable differences between the wide range 
of relevant African constitutional systems. One may also notice, that organic laws have been 
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introduced mostly in former French and Portuguese colonies, Anglo-Saxon countries have less 
tradition in this regard on which they could rely. This phenomenon is not only an African 
particularity, but also a global tendency, as common law countries prefers parliamentary 
sovereignity rather than legislation with qualified majority.
40
 
The African context of organic laws has undergone numerous changes first arising from the 
genocide in Rwanda where a heightened majority system of three fifth of the vote was required 
for the enactment of organic laws.
41
 The next important amendment was perceptible in the 
Maghreb, when the Arap Spring engulved most of the North-African countries, and Tunisia 
introduces certain changes to the characteristics of organic laws in that country that brought it 
closer to Rwanda’s position.42 If an organic law is subject to a presidential veto in Tunisia, the 
parliament could overturn the veto only with a three-fifths majority. An other direction of 
changes might be also worth-contemplating: after the end of the civil war in Ivory Coast, the 
two-thirds system was replaced by a mere absolute majority requirement, which made the 
framework of organic law more flexible, the two-thirds requirement remained only a 
complementary element of the concept.
43
 The overall picture shows, that in most African 
countries, qualified majority means absolute majority as regard legislation, while In Rwanda, 
three-fifths of the votes is needed for the enactment of an organic law. In Burundi,
44
 in the Cape 
Werde Islands,
45
 in the Comoros,
46
 and in Guinea,
47
 two-thirds consent is necessary. On the 
contrary, in Gabon, qualified laws are adopted just with ordinary simple majority the sole 
additional requirement is the mandatory a priory constitutional review.
48
 Gabon is the only 
country of the world, where qualified/organic laws are subject to simple majority consent of the 
legislative body. It is also important to note here, that several African countries require two-
thirds majority for the adoption or amendment of the constitution, but this means a completely 
separate issue, which shall be clearly distinguished from the concept of qualified law. It shall be 
also highlighted, that similarly to the European models, the required majority for certain organic 
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laws may differ even within one constitutional system. To set examples, it is provided expressly 
in some African countries, that the rules on public finances under a special procedure are covered 
by organic laws,
49
 while in other African countries, the basic financial regulations are subject to 
a special procedure, which is close to the organic legislative process. It is also incorporated by 
some African constitutions, that organic laws related to the senate shall be adopted by identical 
terms by the two chambers,
50
 which represents the mere migration of a French constitutional 
provision.
51
 
2.2. The Subject Matter and Role of Organic Law sin Africa 
By general terms, the subject matter of organic laws is two folded; namely: protection of 
institutional frameworks and fundamental rights and freedoms.
52
In Africa, the institutional 
function of organic law has been given primary consideration as a mechanism, but it shall be 
considered with particular weight, that the institutional aspect protects also indirectly 
fundamental rights and freedoms in certain respects, as it will be conceptualized later more 
deeply.
53
 Organic laws are always implemented under the pressure of particular circunstances, to 
promote clear constitutional objectives. For that reason the scope of organic law differs from one 
state to the other on account of various historical and political foundations, despite sharing a 
partly similar origin. 
The categorization of organic laws into defender of institutional frameworks and protector of 
fundamental rights and freedoms provide an indication as to its role in the entire constitutional 
dispensation. The next two subchapters will demonstrate this two direction to interpret the basic 
constitutional purpose of organic laws, even in Europe, or Africa. 
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2.2.1. Defender of Institutional Frameworks 
All legal systems provide extra constitutional rules on the functions, organization and 
relationships of the crucial institutional framework of the state: organic laws were originally 
designed to create specifically strong, but extra-constitutional protection for the key institutions 
of the state. Organic laws regulate the functions of Parliament, status of the judiciary, powers and 
functions of defenders of rights, and the limitation of sovereignty.
54
 Other roles include the 
organization of the military forces, regulation of succession to the throne, or the way to elect the 
president of the republic, and the functioning of the constitutional courts. However, the 
introduction of organic laws in most African states have not been associated with stronger 
institutions, since collapse of constitutional frameworks has been common in Franco-Phone 
Countries as well. If one might compare Francophone and Anglophone countries, there is not any 
evidence, that the institutions of the French-influenced regions, where organic laws are often 
concerned would produce a better record of stability, or a higher level of right protection. 
It is also worth-contemplating, especially from our perspective, that the status and competences 
of the judiciary and the constitutional court are always covered by organic laws in Africa, so 
organic law might be a potential safeguard of long-term stability and judicial independence, as 
will be conceptualized later more deeply. In addition to this, some further key judicial 
institutions are often covered separately by an organic subject matter, as the functioning, 
composition and competences of the highest judicial bodies (constitutional court, supreme 
council of magistrature, supreme court, court of audits, court of cassation, etcetera). 
Nevertheless, not only the organic law has clear impact on the status of the judiciary, but the 
constitutional court has often a mandatory task to check the constitutionality of enacted organic 
laws before their promulgation. This is crucial especially in Gabon, where organic laws are not 
distinguished by qualified majority from ordinary laws, just by the requirement of mandatory a 
priory constitutional review. A brief, but sistematic introduction to the relationship between 
African organic laws and the judicial branch will be conceptualized later. 
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2.2.2. Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms 
Apart from the institutional field, organic laws adopted in Africa had an important role of 
protecting fundamental rights and freedoms, especially in the Maghreb region. Although the 
African concept of organic laws is heavily influenced by the French and eventually by the 
Portuguese model, independent characteristics from the original European concepts has been also 
elaborated. For example, the scope of African organic laws is narrower except that of Burundi 
which purely focuses on institutional frameworks. Organic laws in Africa concentrate on the 
institution of the legislature
55
 and the judiciary.
56
Organic laws in Africa have been extended to 
the regulation of electoral bodies,
57
 elections
58
and the conduct of referendum.
59
Although the 
impression might be created, that organic laws do not protect directly fundamental rights and 
freedoms, in the Maghreb this is not usualy the case. In Morocco for example, the right to 
petition
60
 or take industrial action
61
 is covered by organic law. But these represent mostly 
isolated examples in Africa, as the substantial statutory rules on the protection and limits of 
certain fundamental rights usually (for instance: the national acts on freedom of expression) fall 
outside from the acknowledged scope of African organic laws. 
This brief introduction demonstrates well, that fundamental rights are protected directly by 
African organic laws only in the Maghreb region within a relatively narrow circle. By contrast, 
was far as the indirect aspect is concerned, other African countries focus on the protection of 
such institutions, which might strengthen the cohesive protection of fundamental rights. The 
judicial branch is crucial in this regard, as the heightened level requirement for organic law 
might highlight the independence, and the credibility of the judicial bodies. Since powerful and 
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impartial institutions would keep guard over the proper prevalence of fundamental rights, a 
number of constitutional actors might be concerned by the task of indirect right protection. For 
instance, apart from the courts, the constitutional court and the defender of rights are also 
covered by organic laws as relevant institutions. As for partial conclusion, it is worthy for 
highlight, that although the fact, that relatively a little number of fundamental rights are provided 
explicitely as organic subject matters, organic law shall not be underestimated as an additional 
safeguard of right protection across Africa. 
In most of the concerned African constitutions, the statutory rules on the competences, the 
structure, and the independence of the judicial system are subject to stricter procedural rules, 
than ordinary laws. It is a well-founded principle in several African constitutions, that whoever 
claims, that his/her constitutional rights are breached, is entitled to initiate remedial procedures 
before the judiciary.
62
 As the details of this opportunity is covered by organic law, and also the 
status, and the functioning of those bodies, which are vested with the right to trial these legal 
controversies, these remedies constitute remarkable safeguards for the potential plaintifs, since 
the courts are deemed to be protected effectively from direct political influence. This impact 
might be essential to diminish the vulnerability of citizens vis a vis the public administration, as 
in most cases, constitutional rights are violated by public authorities.
63
 The citizens could rely 
better on the judicial system as an impartial actor, as it has been established by wide political 
consent, and its composition could not be modified without oppositional votes, regardless the 
current political configuration. As the stricter procedural requirements concern also the highest 
judicial bodies, which determine the functioning of the whole judiciary, this factor of trust might 
be relevant in case of particular judges or tribunals, and in the light of the judicial system as a 
whole.
64
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In addition to this, the indirect protection of fundamental rights by African organic laws have 
constituted more instruments as safeguards. It is widespread recently in Africa, that defenders of 
rights, or parliamentary commissioners are elected or nominated, who are authorized to 
investigate each alleged violations of constitutional rights, and in case of well-founded 
complaints, these ombudspersons might initiate certain measures. As this institution is also often 
covered by organic law, the stability and the independence of a further safeguard might be 
strenghtened remarkably owing to the stricter procedural rules. As the ombudspersons are 
usually accessible directly for all citizens, and they represent a crucial and even emerging path to 
seek redress for right violations in Africa,
65
 the importance of the indirect protection of rights 
shall be highlighted again. 
Lastly, the role of the constitutional court as a further institution covered by organic laws shall be 
also taken into consideration, which is at least two-folded. On the one hand, according to the 
relevant constitutional and organic statutory provisions, the constitutional court has a general 
competence to review the substantial constitutionality of certain normative acts and individual 
decisions, which concern the prevalence of fundamental rights in practice. On the basis of the 
constitutionally determined framework, African organic laws outline, who is entitled to turn to 
the constitutional court in case of individual complaints, or the supposed unconstitutionality of 
an act or measure. Apart from this, the status of the constitutional court, and the position of its 
members as individuals are also safeguarded by organic laws, since these guarantees could not 
be removed or amended without wide political support. As a last subpoint, it is also worthy for 
consideration, that most of the relevant African constitutions provides a mandatory a priory 
constitutional review of organic laws before their promulgation by the constitutional court, 
therefore, these laws could not enter into force if they do not comply with the right protection 
standards stipulated by the constitutional norms. As a consequence, organic laws do not cover 
usually the substantial statutory norms for the protection of fundamental rights, but it might 
contribute considerably to the establishment of such a legal surrounding, where the regulations 
and policies are in compliance with constitutional standards of right protection, and where the 
citizens could access effective remedies against any violation of constitutional rights. In the light 
of these points, inspite of the undoubted dominance of the institutional aspect, African organic 
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laws shall be evaluated as indirect, but paramountly important legal instruments for the 
protection of fundamental rights.
66
 
3. Critique of Organic Laws in Africa 
Whereas the concept of organic laws as originally conceptualized in Europe was meant to built 
strong institutions, better protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, mitigate against 
possibilities of dictatorship and ultimately lead to constitutional stability, in Africa, organic laws 
have often failed to facilitate these targets. In states that have adopted organic laws such as Chad, 
the effect has been supposed to be the prolongation of the constitutional dispensation and 
extension of the endurance of existing constitutional regimes.
67
 This is ably demonstrated by the 
numerous constitutional amendments and reforms in Francophone countries of the continent,
68
 
which undermines the hipothesis, that organic law could serve as a factor of stabilization in 
Africa. This is also a consequence of the lack of long-term political and constitutional culture, as 
organic law could function as a safeguard only if uncodified constitutional norms and 
conventions bound the margin of movement of the political and constitutional actors strictly. 
Without these mechanisms, organic law might just deepen the fragmentation of the political 
arena, and may even increase the motivation to amend the constitutional framework by violent 
means.
69
 This is further exacerbated by certain derivatives of organic laws in Africa such as 
those practiced in Rwanda and Tunisia that require a heightened level of consent (three-fifths). 
The stricter form of qualified legislation, the two thirds majority, which has been aplied only by 
a little number of African countries have been critisized for distorting parliamentary 
democracy.
70
 According to these concerns, the two-thirds requirement would mean a too severe 
limit on the governmental margin of decision, or in case of strong parliamentary majority, it 
would almost eliminate the opposition from decision-making processes on the long term. 
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Moreover, the question as to whether organic laws have been better at the protection of 
fundamental rights and freedoms in Francophone countries as compared to Anglo-Phone 
countries in Africa is premature since Francophone countries have witnessed some of the worst 
violations of human rights on the African continent.
71
 Examples include Burundi, Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Ivory Coast and Rwanda. Bearing in this in mind, it shall be noted, 
that in the light of the fact, that organic law has not been copied automatically from European 
modells to Africa, the adaptation has not been proper, and a partial or full reconsideration of the 
African framework of organic law might be necessary. 
4. Organic laws in Africa: its impact to the constitutional adjudication, and to the 
judicial branch 
The task of this subchapter is just to conceptualize briefly, how organic laws could influence the 
African development of constitutional adjudication, and the judicial branch, and to outline 
certain recommendations for future constitution-making processes. 
As regard the constitutional adjudication of Africa, organic laws extend remarkably the 
competences of the constitutional court, and due to this phenomena, the separation of powers is 
also influenced by this legal concept in at least two respects.
72
 Firstly, the status, and the 
competences of the constitutional court, and also the constitutional judges are covered not only 
by constitutional norms, but also by organic statutes. This means by practical terms, that the 
different political parties shall create a wider consent to adopt and amend these rules, which 
could provide certain level of permanence and stability for the constitutional court, as far as the 
regulatory background is concerned. Moreover, the constitutional court is entitled to review any 
modification of its status, which would mean a crucial safeguard against any endeavour to 
weaken the role of the constitutional court as a counterbalance. Especially within the African 
circunstances, these considerations are significant, nevertheless, constitutional changes are often 
launched via extra-legal means, when organic laws are not able to fulfil their inherent tasks.
73
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Secondly, the mere existence of organic law creates a new ground of constitutional review for 
the constitutional court, which embroaden its margin of movement against the legislation. When 
a bill shall be passed as organic law, but it is enacted as ordinary statute, the constitutional court 
might annul that particular act. If an ordinary law contains certain provisions, which have 
organic character, the constitutional court has again the power to rule these provisions out.
74
 
Apart from these issues, the value of organic laws as a legal source is always dubious, so the 
constitutional court shall clarify this issue also.
75
 In Africa, this second point has less relevance, 
as the dogmatic background has not been elaborated in depth by the African literature. 
Turning now to the judicial branch, it is essential, that in several African states, a wide range of 
judicial bodies are subject to the stricter legislative requirement. For instance, apart from the 
ordinary courts, the court of audits, or the supreme council of magistratures fall also within the 
enumeration of organic subject matters. As a consequence, the detailed constitutional status of 
the judicial branch is protected from daily political interventions, and the organisational model of 
the judiciary, or the status of the judges could be amended only in case of wide political consent, 
and only after a priory constitutional review of the proposed amendment.
76
 This solution would 
strenghten the independence of this branch of power, as the legislation and the executive has 
considerably less chance to influence the structure of the judiciary unilaterally. This 
consideration shall be given particular weight in Africa, where the strong representation of the 
judiciary is widespread amongst the qualified legislative subject matters.
77
 The reason of this 
greater highlight on the judiciary is explained by the direct French influence, as the French 
Constitution declares a wide range of laws concerning the judiciary as organic.
78
 
On the basis of this brief introduction, one might raise the question: how could organic law 
funnction more efficiently in Africa, especially to promote further the independence of the 
judicial branch, and the credibility of the constitutional adjudication? One might argue, that the 
better would be to abolish organic law, as a separate legal concept, but in our view, due to its role 
                                                          
74
 P Ducoulombier „Rebalancing the power between the Executive and Parliament: the experience of French 
constitutional reform” (2010) 4 Public Law 688. 
75
 S Alberts; C Warshaw & BR Weingast “Democratization and Countermajoritarian Institutions: Power and 
Constitutional Design in Self-Enforcing Democracy” in T Ginsburg (ed) Comparative Constitutional Design (2012). 
76
 D Landau „The Importance of Constitution-Making” (2011) 2 Denver University Law Review 611-614. 
77
 The status, composition, competences, and functioning of the highest judicial bodies; the rules to initiate and 
conduct a judicial proceeding; the structure safeguards of the judicial independence 
78
 M Troper „Constitutional Law” in G Berman & E Picard (n 12 above) 1-34. 
17 
 
as a safeguard, it has a number of advantages to maintain this legal framework. In this respect, 
we have three main recommendations, which we could just put forward now, but their potential 
implementation requires further research, and professional discourse. Firstly, mandatory a priory 
judicial review shall be preferred as an element of organic law over the different forms of 
qualified majority. The heightened majority requirement could force different political parties to 
negotiate with each other, but without honest intention, the outcome would be at least uncertain. 
By contrast, the mandatory a priory judicial review could exclude unconstitutional contents from 
the legal system, especially when initiations might be also sent to the constitutional court before 
its assessment. Secondly, the African legal literature should provide a more detailed analysis of 
the issue of organic law across the continent, in more than 20 countries, to provide a more broad 
picture from this legal instrument, and to gain a deeper understanding of its special African 
characteristics. Such research could also reveal valuable points from several dogmatic problems, 
such as the place of organic law within the hierarchy of norms. Thirdly, a relatively narrow scope 
of organic lawis advisable. A stricter form of legislation is justifiable for a narrow circle of key 
state institutions, but organic law could distort the parliamentary system, and restrict the 
competences of the government heavily. 
Conclusion 
As concluding remarks, although organic laws originated in Western- and Central Europe 
(France, Spain and Hungary), its influence has spread to other parts of the world especially in 
Latin America and Africa also. The Frenc sample was mostly followed by numerous African 
states, owing to the colonial past of these countries. However, organic law as a legal concept has 
not been adopted wholesome but has been modified remarkably by specific local circumstances 
to fit regional requirements. Organic law adopted with three-fifths majority, which has been 
introduced in Rwanda and Tunisia is uniquely African innovations, similar solutions might not 
be perceptible in other continents. Although organic laws have tremendously influenced 
constitutional development in Africa, due to its relatively, but potentially still too wide scope, the 
influence has relativelly less highlight, than in Europe. It shall be admitted, that Francophone 
countries that adopted organic laws have not performed better in terms of protecting human 
rights than those that did not. Some of these countries in the Great Lakes region suffer from 
18 
 
weak institutions, massive violations of human rights, and a poor record of the rule of law. We 
have four main statements, which have been intended to be proved in this study.  
Firstly, African organic laws are mostly inspired by European samples, however, the African 
organic laws are deemed to be independent legal concepts, not mere copy of European (French) 
constitutional provisions.
79
  
Secondly, although the fact, that the European approach of organic law is based on a proper 
balance between the institutional and the human rights approach, in Africa the fundamental right 
aspect has been almost completely neglected, organic laws cover generally the basic institutional 
framework of the state.  
Thirdly, African (and European) organic laws could promote rarely the endurance of the 
constitutional framework, consequently, the justification of their existence is not convincing. 
Fourthly, on the basis on this experience, one may argue, that organic laws may be more 
influentious in Africa, when the judicial branch would be more concerned by this legal 
framework: the constitutional adjudication might have more respect, and judicial independence 
might be protected better.  
To facilitate the further analysis from this increased level of protection, we put forward some 
recommendations just to prefer mandatory a priory judicial review over qualified majority; to 
diminish the scope of organic law; and to conduct more academic research to conceptualize an 
even deeper understanding of African organic laws, and their impact to the judicial branch. We 
are aware of the fact, that our contribution leaves more question opened, then closed, however, 
our primary purpose was not to give exclusive answers, but to raise proper questions, and to 
generate further intense professional discussion from this topic. 
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